optimism for the American dream as it related to his next presidency.
As the positive identity, resonance, and upbeat tone stayed in Americans' minds, candidate association or branding was embedded in voters' political brains and was ready to be utilized by incoming political messages (Westen 2007, 73) . (Benoit, McKinney, and Holbert 2001; Hellweg, Pfau, and Brydon 1992; Kaid et al. 2007; Westen 2007) . Therefore, it is not achievable to comprehend how campaign messages are processed and reach certain conclusions by using a single predominant model, especially from the ad-hoc and top-down perspective of the information sources (e.g., political candidates and parties) and distributors (e.g., media channels and campaign formats).
Scholars in the fields of political science and communication have admitted the limitations of conventional approaches based on a single factor of partisanship, a one-way information flow from the information sources to the receivers, and sole rational choice models from the calculation of input to output. The conclusions reached by these traditional approaches and measurements have greater shortcomings to predict current political outcomes and consequences due to the dynamic processes of political decision-making, the broad and interactive networks in political communication, and the nonlinear input and output of political information in the new communication era (Bennett and Manheim 2006; Dahlgren 2005; Scammell 2007; Wang 2007) .
Those ad-hoc traditional approaches become problematic when the models need to explain gradual effects of multi-strategic campaign effects, such as televised debates. The series of televised presidential debates have been proven to be the most salient campaign strategy (Kraus 2011) . However, the theoretical understanding of the series of televised presidential debates has been even more limited than other types of political communication. In the American campaign system, the series of televised presidential debates take place in the last one or two months of the final campaign before the election. Due to the fixed exogenous political system, therefore, scholars are often even more reluctant to explore the endogenous gradual effect of the televised presidential debates within voters at the very end of the campaign. In order to understand the campaign effects of voters' gradual endogenous changes through a series of political events, voter-oriented post-hoc theoretical adoption is required. Westen (2007) supports the voter-oriented approach arguing that one of the most strategic and consistently valid campaign tactics is to understand voters' minds rather than simply informing or educating them using a specific method or form of campaign (Westen 2007, 75) . 
Theoretical Underpinnings

Political Brand Equity Building in the Campaign Battles
The theory of branding originated from the field of marketing and started to gain significant academic and practical popularity in marketplace management in the early 1990s (Scammell 2007) . It became one of the core strategies to maximize given assets and limited resources beyond the boundaries of the fields of marketing and management, and it has been widely applied to non-business human interactions (Newman 1991) . Brandings are intangible equities and vibrant processes intended to make targets immediately recognizable, gradually likable, consistently trustful, and eventually desirable in broader arena (Keller and Lehmann 2006; Wheeler 2006) .
Just like what strategic marketers do for their commercial products, in the process of political communication, political candidates, as image and policy sellers, also create their own unique brands to differentiate themselves from other competitors and to be more appealing to voters utilizing strategic communication, and thus eventually win an election (Adolphsen 2009 ).
In political campaigns and elections, voters perceive not only congruent but also conflicting images and values about a target subject and individual, and they continuously build up the image of a political candidate and construct attitudes toward the candidate (Barnett, Serota, and Taylor 1976) . Political candidates and voters try to adjust their political personalities, characteristics, and preferences to create meaningful brand values and relationships in the same way that advertisers and consumers interact (Blackston 1993; Graeff 1997) .
Cognitive and emotional interactions between target brands and consumers are an important parameter of political branding research. Individuals "posit cognitive accessibility" to public figures in a variety of ways due to their different levels of emotional interaction (Druckman and McDermott 2008, 297) . Therefore, "incorporating emotion into studies" (299) is a necessary process to understand individuals' cognitive framing and the consequences of liking and disliking targets. Moreover, preexisting emotions "amplify or depress a frame's impact" (289). Druckman and McDermott (2008) also argue that individual's behaviors are more likely to reflect his or her preferences as the individual's confidence in the preferences increases, and increased confidence in a preferred target induces congruent information seeking against opposing information and persuasion.
Although both the policy positions and the personalities of candidates play dynamic roles in voters' political brains, a number of researchers have suggested that voters' emotional connections with candidates and their positive images of the candidates are stronger predictors of voting behavior than candidates' factual issue stances and impersonal personalities (Kaid et al. 2007; Smith 2001; Westen 2007, 119) .
Due to implicit and unstructured candidate branding effects (Milewicz and Milewicz 2014) , voters' perceptions are not always quantifiable even when accounting for their cognitive variability (e.g., opinion strengths and knowledge levels), emotional interaction, and different demographic characteristics. The effects of candidates' intended symbolic signals on voters' perceptions of them, conveyed through their tones of voice, facial expressions, representative colors, values, and body gestures, are a totally different level of non-paradigmatic scholarly research. The campaign itself is a very unstructured process, and the process and outcome are even more difficult to trace with a consistent theoretical application (French and Smith 2010; Shaw 1999, 345-346; Smith and French 2009 ). Despite increasing interests in the area of political branding (Reeves, Chernatony, and Carrigan 2006) , therefore, there has been limited research on political candidate branding and no general theoretical models to apply to various types of political branding in order to examine the effects of branding in the campaign and election processes (Smith 2009; Smith and French 2009 ).
As a result, more comprehensive but consistent theoretical tools and mechanisms that can explain multiple factors and consequences have been sought. Although they are still experiential approaches, The current study adapts the Customer-Based Brand Equity (CBBE) model by Keller (2001) to develop a model of Voter-Based Political Candidate Brand Equity. In the process of brand building described by Keller, the first step is to establish a shared brand identity, the second step is to create a favorable brand meaning, the third step is to elicit a brand response from consumers, and the last step is to forge a brand relationship between brands and consumers. As business marketers invest their resources to build a brand desire for their products in consumers' minds (Keller 2001 
Identity
According to Keller's model, the first stage of brand equity building is to create brand identity, which means knowing "who you are" (Keller 2001, 5) . At this stage, advertisers make their brands appear to be more salient, recognizable, and distinguishable in consumers' minds (Keller 2001 (Keller 2001, 9) , Barack Obama's "change" and John McCain's "maverick" descriptors were their political brand identities in voters' minds during the 2008 presidential campaign (see Figure 1 ).
Meaning
The second stage of the brand equity model is to create brand meaning, which means understanding "what you are." Brand meaning is about "performance and imagery" (Keller 2001, 9) . In marketing, it is consumers' knowledge about brand quality and experience with the brand (Keller 2001) . In political battles, a candidate's political brand meaning can be interpreted as his or her functional political performance as well as abstract imagery in the past, and it is created when voters learn about the candidate's performance in his or her political history and the candidate meets voters' political needs and expectations. In other words, the reliability, trustworthiness, effectiveness, and efficiency of a candidate in his or her previous political work history, and voters' political experiences with the candidate are important criteria for brand meaning. In addition, as
Keller made a note in his model (Keller 2001) , and as other political 
Response
The third stage is to activate brand response and stimulate positive feedback from the target audiences. At this stage in marketing, customers respond to brands with both their "head" and "heart" and understand "what I think or feel about you" (Keller 2001, 13) . A brand needs to cultivate consumers' positive "judgment," "preference," "approval," and "gravity" to get consumers' response to accomplish this stage (Keller 2001) . In the political campaign process, this is the stage in which political candidates bring out voters' desirable responses to their campaign promises. With some level of rationale and emotion, voters make judgments and evaluations of a political candidate's qualifications, credibility, competency, and likeability, and then they react to the candidacy. Understanding from Keller's examples of Nike and Starbucks as successful brands that move both the "head" and "heart" of people (Keller 2001, 22) Kraus (1988) found that about 60% of voters said that televised debates were more helpful in deciding whom to vote for than TV news or TV ads. According to Boydstun et al. (2013) , 8% of debate watchers actually changed their voting choice after viewing a televised presidential debate during the 2012 general election (Boydstun et al. 2013) .
A wide range of research has examined the effects of televised presidential debates, but has had mixed findings and arguments. For instance, Benoit, Hansen, and Verser (2003) Benoit and Hansen's later study (2004) found that the televised debates increase voters' levels of political information and reinforce preexisting preference and attitudes. Holbert (2005) reconfirmed the thesis that viewing debates reinforces preexisting political attitudes such as party identification. These studies imply that televised debates can benefit lesser-known challengers more in the earlier stages of brand building by introducing challenger candidates' political identities and images, but eventually intensify existing political perceptions of, and attitudes toward, both challenger and incumbent candidates with more debate exposure toward the later stages of the campaign, and thus lead to increasing benefits for both lesser-known challenger and better-known incumbent candidates in the end. Moreover, Geer (1988) added that debate exposure has a more significant effect on undecided voters than on voters who already have preexisting preferences. The majority of these debate studies were conducted based on ad-hoc theoretical approaches analyzing candidates' strategies in a single or one-time debate, neither initiating the studies from audience-sided post-hoc perspectives nor tracing the gradual effects of a series of the debates.
Despite the fixed exogenous system of a series of televised debates in the contemporary U.S. election and the importance of voters' endogenous perceptional changes by the course of televised debate series, the effect of the sequentially televised presidential debates has not been sufficiently explored, especially from voters' perspectives, for there to be reliable and valid theories and models to measure the gradual changes and outcomes of the cumulative campaign messages.
Although limited research has been done, there are a number of relevant studies that can provide sparse, implied, and heuristic effects of the sequentially televised presidential debates.
There has been research on the effects of repeated positive and negative political information. For example, repeated exposure to positive campaign messages induces more positive voters' evaluations of the target candidates (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989) , and repeated exposure to negative campaign messages, such as attack advertisements, increases voters' negative attitudes toward not only the target candidates but also elections in general (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996; Kaid et al. 2007) . Some studies examined the effects of short-and long-term political information exposure. For instance, even though there are mixed results for short-or long-term campaign effects, short-term campaign information exposure has not been shown to be enough to change voters' attitudes or perceptions due to voters' preexisting opinions, levels of knowledge, and demographic characteristics (Bartles 1993) . However, the amount and frequency of exposure to campaign information about political candidates over the campaign period are crucial factors that determine voters' attitudes toward those candidates (Jones 1998, 404-406 ).
In addition, there have been studies that measure the persuasion effects of repeated political messages combined with other moderating and mediating factors. Jones (1998) found that the old-fashioned style of candidates' visits increases voters' political participation, and the frequency and timing of visits enhance campaign effects. He emphasized the efficient allocation of campaign resources to achieve timely and appropriate cumulative campaign effects. He also found that cumulative message exposure achieves different levels of success depending on partisan lines. For instance, Democratic candidates' visits are more likely to increase overall voting turnout and Democratic voters are more likely to respond to such campaign exposure than the Republican candidates and voters (Jones 1998 ). Cacioppo and Petty (1989) argued that repeated messages increase persuasion effects, but the effects of repeated messages interact with other factors such as the quality of the argument.
In an experimental study of multi-dimensional attitude changes, Barnett and his colleagues found that the perceived distance between different candidates increases and the volume of perceived dimensions among difference factors, such as party identifications and issue stances, expands due to "increased clarification" with increasing campaign information (Barnett et al. 1976, 238) . Utilizing time-series analyses, Shaw (1999) added that the weekly accumulation of campaign information can strengthen voters' preexisting attitudes or preferences, but it is less likely to change the direction of support.
However, the perceptual space of conceptual dimensions among political factors would also "shrink as the election drew near" due to the increased salience of the political processes and issues (Barnett et al. 1976, 238) . Therefore, their studies proposed opposite and mixed projections. More directly looking into the effects of sequentially televised presidential debates, her colleagues (2010, 2016) found 
Research Design and Method
Three presidential debates that were televised live from 9:00-10:30 p.m. (EST) on October 3, October 16, and October 22 of 2012, sponsored by the Commission on Presidential Debates, were used as stimuli for the quasi-experimental panel research. The study participants were assigned into seven different groups over the course of the 2012 televised presidential debates: the first group was exposed to only the first live debate (n = 255); the second group was exposed to only the second live debate (n = 265); the third group was exposed to only the third live debate (n = 326); the fourth group was exposed to only the first and second live debates (n = 132); the fifth group was exposed to only the first and third live debates (n = 142); the sixth group was exposed to only the second and third live debates (n = 146); and the seventh group was exposed to all three live debates (n = 196). There was also a control group that was never exposed to any of the debates (n = 18). The participants watched the debates in real time, in lab settings, on university campuses, and filled out the questionnaires before and after the exposure to the live debates.
In this quasi-experimental panel study design, participants' additional campaign information exposures in their daily lives beyond the repeated measures experiments were controlled for the purpose of hypothesis tests in the effects of the cumulative exposure mainly to the sequentially televised debates. In the pre-tests, participants who reported that they watched the debates any other time over the course of the panel experimental study were excluded from the analyses, and only those who answered that they were rarely exposed to other types of the campaign messages, such as political ads, debate commentaries, social media posts, talk radio shows, and political discussions with other people, were selected for the tests. Then, the participants were recategorized into four groups: a group with no debate exposure, a group with exposure to only one debate, a group with exposure to only two debates, and a group with exposure to all three debates. These four groups with different degrees of debate exposure were compared.
In addition, the panel group that viewed all three live presidential lower reliability using college student samples, earlier studies proved that the effect sizes of the analysis significance for the samples were consistent across different age groups especially in quasi-experimental research designs with pre-post intervention test formats to do repeated measures tests for nonequivalent group comparisons (Benoit et al. 2003; Kenny 1975) . The total valid number of participants in the panel study was 723. Of the total sample, 38.9% (n = 281) were Republicans, 32.4% (n = 234) were Democrats, and 22.7% (n = 164)
were Independents. Sixty percent (n = 434) of the participants were female and 33.2% (n = 240) were male. Out of the sample, 67.8%
(n = 490) were White, 8% (n =58%) were Hispanic, 5.5% (n = 40)
were Black, 5% (n = 36) were Asian, and 7.5% (n = 54) were other minorities. The percentages for each demographic factor did not add up to 100% due to missing cases with unanswered questions. The mean age for the sample was 21 years old.
There were 196 study participants who viewed all three debates and completed the questionnaire before and afterward, 307 who watched any two of the debates and completed the questionnaire, and 190 who viewed only one of the three debates and completed the questionnaire. As a control group, there were 18 participants who completed the questionnaire without ever being exposed to any of the debates. In the first stage of analysis, the four groups with different degrees of debate exposure were compared to see whether the frequency of debate exposure determined the level of candidate brand value building. In the second stage of analysis, the group that was exposed to all three debates was analyzed separately in order to observe the gradual process of candidates' relational brand equity building in voters' minds over the course of the three televised presidential debates.
Results
This study predicted that exposure to televised political debates could build a level of relational brand equity between voters and candidates, and that sequential exposure to the debates gradually Although the post-hoc test results were somewhat weak (p ≤ 0.10), the participants who viewed at least two of the debates were more likely to learn about what Obama could do and respond to his potentials and promises than people with no debate exposure.
However, the multiple debate exposure did not lead to further relational equity building between Obama and the voters beyond voters' response to his messages, and it was not sufficient to persuade voters to see why his reelection would be important enough to them to give him consistent political support (see Table 1 Table 1 and Graph 1). with the voters to persuade them why his reelection was important to them to get further political support (see Table 2 and Graph 2).
Through the cumulative debate exposure, voters also learned (Benoit et al. 2003; Benoit and Hansen 2004; Holbert 2005) . Ostrow (1982) and other marketing scholars have provided the reasons that the campaign message has a significant effect on awareness and recall, but the effects become significantly weaker when the brands or target subjects come to the stage to get attitudes and actual supports (Cannon, Leckenby, and Abernethy 2002, 17) .
Unlike the traditional wisdom that the first debate in the series is the most powerful in learning about candidates' issues and images (Holbrook 1999, 71; Sears and Chaffee 1979, 110) 
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